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Managing California’s Fiscal
Roller Coaster
by David Gamage
When Proposition 13 passed in 1978, many com-
mentators predicted disaster for California’s state
and local finances. Now, 30 years later, California is
experiencing severe fiscal instability and a round of
budget crises that has been worse than other states’.
It would be wrong to blame Proposition 13 for all
of California’s financial woes. Nevertheless, Propo-
sition 13 is both an important component and a
powerful symbol of California’s flawed fiscal consti-
tution.
The phrase ‘‘fiscal constitution’’ refers to the rules
and processes whereby states and localities make
decisions regarding taxes and spending. California’s
fiscal constitution consists of its initiative process as
well as its legislative budgeting process.
Many commentators have critiqued California’s
fiscal constitution from ideological perspectives.
From the vantage point of someone who wants
higher taxes and spending, the problem lies with the
restrictions imposed on raising revenue — such as
Proposition 13’s limits on property taxes. But from
the perspective of someone who thinks taxes and
spending are too high, the problem may lie with
automatic spending programs or overspending dur-
ing economic upturns, or in a disconnect between
legislators’ spending preferences and voters’.
This article attempts to navigate between those
ideological perspectives to offer nonpartisan solu-
tions to California’s repeated budget crises. Regard-
less of one’s preferences for levels of taxes and
spending, state and local finances need to be man-
aged in the face of political disagreement and chang-
ing economic conditions. Although liberals might
view California as having a revenue problem, and
conservatives a spending problem, everyone can
agree that the disconnect between revenue and
expenditures is a problem.
Without dramatic changes to
California’s fiscal constitution,
growth periods will be only
temporary calms between fiscal
storms.
Despite the predictions of some overly enthusias-
tic commentators, the Internet revolution of the
1990s did not eliminate the business cycle. As long
as state economies cycle between booms and busts,
states will face predictable uncertainty regarding
future revenue. We can thus expect budget crises to
be a regular feature of California’s fiscal landscape
in the coming decades. Those crises will likely be
interspersed with periods of strong economic growth
and revenue surpluses. But without dramatic
changes to California’s fiscal constitution, those
growth periods will be only temporary calms be-
tween fiscal storms.
This article will begin by discussing the relation-
ship between state budget crises and the business
cycle, and why California’s unique tax structure
creates a worse fiscal roller coaster than in the other
states. However, the focus of this article is on the
manner in which California’s fiscal constitution
exacerbates its fiscal roller coaster problem. The
article will present and analyze a number of alter-
natives for reforming California’s fiscal constitution
so as to ameliorate the dynamics that now lead to
repeated budget crises.
The Role of the Business Cycle
Perhaps the most important cause of state budget
crises is the ordinary workings of the business cycle.
Unfortunately, the economic causes of the business
cycle are not fully understood. Many of the most
prominent theories involve elements of psychology
and neoclassical economic reasoning. It seems likely
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that economic actors become overly optimistic about
future prospects during upturns, leading to excess
investment and inventory buildup, which ultimately
creates the need for readjustments and cutbacks
during economic downturns.
Whatever the underlying causes of business
cycles, there is general recognition that business
cycles exist and that they are likely to continue to
exist for the foreseeable future. From the perspec-
tive of state fiscal management — rather than
macroeconomic management — the most important
features of the business cycle are its implications for
taxes and spending programs. During economic
downturns, tax revenue plummets just as the de-
mand for many spending programs increases. The
reverse happens during upturns: Revenue accumu-
lates while the demand for spending programs de-
creases.
The shift from an upturn to a downturn can be
abrupt, with profound consequences for state bud-
geting. For instance, California’s general fund
revenue grew 20 percent in 2000 — the final year of
the Internet boom — only to fall by 17 percent in
2002.1 Liberals and conservatives can argue about
whether spending was too high in 2000 or too low in
2002, but it cannot be disputed that the budgets
passed assuming a continuation of the economic
conditions of the late 1990s proved a poor match for
the conditions of the current decade.
With hindsight, it is easy to blame poor budgeting
on shortsighted or irresponsible behavior by legisla-
tors or by forecasting staffs.2 But that ignores the
realities of the forecasting process.3 Although many
experts predicted the end of the tech boom, fore-
casters had no way of knowing exactly how long the
boom would last. Indeed, there was no shortage of
commentators proclaiming an end to the business
cycle and arguing that the strong growth of the late
1990s would continue for decades.
Even if forecasters had been able to ignore the
most optimistic projections, it isn’t enough just to
know that a boom will eventually end (or that a
bubble will eventually burst). Forecasters need to
make predictions yearly. Forecasters sometimes
stress the uncertainty of their projections. But dis-
claimers and other means for conveying uncertainty
are easy to ignore in favor of the hard numbers of the
actual projections. Ultimately, state budget proc-
esses require hard numbers, and even uncertain
numbers have a great deal of influence.
Unless economists or other scholars create new
technologies for predicting the future course of state
economies and budgets that are far superior to the
methods we have today, states will continue to
experience dramatic revenue swings as their econo-
mies cycle between booms and busts. The painful
adjustments that states will need to make at the
beginning of each downturn are the primary cause of
budget crises.
The Role of California’s Tax Base
California relies on income taxation as a propor-
tion of its overall revenue more than almost any
other state does, while relying on property taxation
much less than the other states do. Proposition 13 is
perhaps the most important cause of California’s
unique tax structure.4 Property tax collections in
California fell by over 50 percent following the
enactment of Proposition 13 in 1978. The growth of
property tax revenue in the last 30 years has been
much slower in California than in the other states,
while the growth of income tax collections has been
considerably faster.5
California relies on income
taxation as a proportion of its
overall revenue more than almost
any other state does, while relying
on property taxation much less
than the other states do.
California’s tax mix results in significantly
greater fiscal volatility, because income tax revenue
is among the most volatile of the major state funding
sources while property tax revenue is among the
least volatile. That greater volatility of California’s
revenue structure has led to California enjoying
improved fiscal capacity during economic upturns,
but it has also led to much more severe budget crises
during economic downturns.
The defenders of Proposition 13 sometimes draw
attention to the fact that it has decreased the
volatility of California’s property tax revenue.
1Jon David Vasche and Brad Williams, ‘‘Revenue Volatility
in California,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr. 4, 2005, p. 35, Doc
2005-4744, or 2005 STT 63-2.
2There is some evidence that state forecasting is slightly
biased in a politically motivated fashion, but this bias does
not explain inaccurate forecasts of changing economic condi-
tions. Richard T. Boylan, ‘‘Political Distortions in State Fore-
casts,’’ Public Choice, April 2008.
3See National Association of State Budget Officers, ‘‘Bud-
geting Amid Fiscal Uncertainty: Ensuring Budget Stability
by Focusing on the Long Run.’’ 2004.
4Proposition 13 had three major components: it limited ad
valorem property taxes to a maximum rate of 1 percent (with
a few exceptions); it limited the rate at which the assessed
value of property can increase for property tax purposes to 2
percent, even during periods when the real value of a property
is increasing far more rapidly; and it imposed a two-thirds
supermajority requirement on any legislatively enacted
change to state taxes for the purpose of raising revenue.
5Public Policy Institute of California, ‘‘Fiscal Realities:
Budget Tradeoffs in California Government,’’ 2007, p. 26.
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Because Proposition 13 limits the growth of ap-
praised values for the purposes of property tax
assessment even when market values are growing
rapidly, most homeowners find that over time, their
homes’ appraised values are much lower than the
market values. If market values later fall — as is
now happening in California — homeowners will not
see a reduction in their tax bills unless the market
values fall to below the appraised values for prop-
erty tax assessment. Hence, property tax revenue
may continue growing even during periods of hous-
ing price declines.
Although Proposition 13 reduces
the volatility of California’s
property tax revenue, that effect is
dwarfed by the greater volatility
that has resulted from shifting
California’s tax base.
Although Proposition 13 reduced the volatility of
California’s property tax revenue, that effect is
dwarfed by the greater volatility that has resulted
from shifting California’s tax base away from prop-
erty taxation and toward income taxation. Even in
states without property tax limitations, property
taxes remain one of the least volatile sources of
revenue.6 Moreover, whereas the other major
sources of state revenue tends to rise and fall simul-
taneously, property tax revenue tends to follow their
own course. Property tax revenue sometimes rises
and falls with the overall state economy — as is now
happening. But it is not uncommon for property tax
revenues to continue rising while the state economy
and its other revenue sources are entering a down-
turn — as occurred in 2001. Because of the greater
stability of property taxes and their countercyclical
tendencies, if California could increase its use of
property taxation, the volatility of the state’s rev-
enue structure would be greatly reduced and bud-
getary crises would become both less common and
less severe.
Another factor leading to greater fiscal volatility
in California and thus to more severe budget crises
during downturns is the state’s relatively high reli-
ance on capital gains taxation. California is one of
only seven states that taxes capital gains at the
same rates as ordinary income, and California
derives a much higher percentage of its overall
revenue from capital gains taxation than do most of
the other states.7 Over the last 30 years, capital
gains have been five times more volatile than wages
and salaries or than consumption. Hence, revenue
from capital gains taxation is considerably more
volatile than revenue from the taxation of ordinary
income or sales taxes.
Some commentators have suggested that Califor-
nia move away from taxing capital gains and shift
toward a less volatile tax base. Yet the most volatile
sources of state revenue are also the most progres-
sive sources of state revenue. Switching toward a
more stable tax base requires moving toward a
regressive tax base — by moving away from taxing
capital or taxing ordinary income at high marginal
rates. Property taxes are unique among the major
sources of state revenue in that they are relatively
nonvolatile, while taxing capital (at least to some
extent) and being capable (at least arguably) of
progressivity in their incidence.8
If California voters wish to retain the level of
progressivity embedded in the state’s tax structure,
and do not wish to overturn Proposition 13 and
enact significantly higher property taxes, the rev-
enue structure will continue to exhibit high levels of
fiscal volatility. Without major reforms to either
California’s tax base structure or to the fiscal con-
stitution, we should expect repeated budget crises
over the coming decades. If current trends continue,
those budget crises are likely to become more severe.
Californians may end up looking back on their
current budget troubles with nostalgia.
The Role of California’s Fiscal Constitution
Because of the workings of the business cycle and
long-term trends in the economics of healthcare and
education spending, budget crises will continue to be
a recurring part of California’s fiscal landscape.9
6J. Fried Giertz, ‘‘The Property Tax Bound,’’ National Tax
Journal, September 2006; Russell S. Sobel and Gary A.
Wagner, ‘‘Cyclical Variability in State Government Revenue:
Can Tax Reform Reduce It?’’State Tax Notes, Aug. 25, 2003, p.
569, Doc 2003-19091, or 2003 STT 164-2.
7The other states are Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minne-
sota, and North Carolina. David L. Sjoquist and Sally
Wallace, ‘‘Capital Gains: Its Recent, Varied, and Growing (?)
Impact on State Revenues,’’ State Tax Notes, Aug. 18, 2003, p.
497, Doc 2003-18743, or 2003 STT 159-2.
8The extent to which property taxes burden capital as
opposed to other sources is controversial, as is the degree to
which property taxes can be made progressive. See George R.
Zodrow, ‘‘The Property Tax Incidence Debate and the Mix of
State and Local Finance of Local Public Expenditures,’’
CESifo Economic Studies, Jan. 2008. Note, however, that
property taxes can be made more progressive through the use
of circuit breakers and related devices. See Karen Lyons,
Sarah Farkas, and Nicholas Johnson, ‘‘The Property Tax
Circuit Breaker: An Introduction and Survey of Current
Programs,’’ report by the Center on Budget and Policy Priori-
ties, Mar. 21, 2007.
9Education and healthcare spending in the United States
has been growing faster than gross domestic product. In
particular, healthcare spending jumped to 15 percent of GDP
in 2007, from under 5 percent of GDP in 1960. If current
trends continue, the Congressional Budget Office projects
Special Report
(Footnote continued on next page.)
State Tax Notes, September 8, 2008 661
(C) Tax Analysts 2008. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
Because of California’s choice of a highly volatile
(and more progressive) tax base, those crises will
almost undoubtedly be more severe in California
than in the other states. In light of those challenges,
it is crucial for California’s political establishment to
be able to confront the hard choices presented by
budget crises. Unfortunately, the structure of the
fiscal constitution stands in the way of proactive
solutions to California’s budgetary dilemmas.
Like all other states’, California’s political estab-
lishment is composed of diverse interest groups that
have different preferences for tax and spending
policy. Some of those groups would like to see taxes
lowered, while others would like to see additional
revenue raised to fund their desired spending pro-
grams. During times of significant budgetary short-
falls, the conflicts between those groups can become
particularly intense.
If the State Legislature were the sole arbiter of
budget policy, and the Legislature weren’t bound by
supermajority requirements, responses to budget
shortfalls would depend primarily on which mix of
interest groups controlled a majority of votes in the
Legislature. If pro-spending groups controlled a
majority, we would expect to see tax increases.
Similarly, we would expect spending cuts if antitax
interest groups controlled a majority. Or if neither
side controlled a strong majority, we might expect a
compromise policy containing both tax increases and
spending cuts.
Yet California’s fiscal constitution differs from
that picture in several important respects. Not only
does it take more than a simple majority of the
Legislature to enact budgetary reforms, but the
Legislature is far from the only arena in which
budgetary policy can be enacted. Those factors com-
bine to create an environment in which interest
groups often find it far easier to advance their policy
preferences through the initiative process than
through the legislative process.
California’s constitution requires a two-thirds
majority vote in both chambers to pass a budget or to
raise taxes.10 Those supermajority requirements
enable a determined minority of the Legislature to
block any budgetary reform the minority disagrees
with. When combined with the governor’s veto and
other legislative roadblocks, the two-thirds super-
majority requirement makes it unlikely that any
political party or coalition of interest groups will
have a sufficient majority to enact its desired bud-
getary reforms in the face of determined opposition.
Exacerbating that problem is California’s system
of term limits, which gives state legislators little
incentive to compromise in the short term to build
longer-term working relationships. There is little
that a majority coalition can offer the minority to
gain the minority’s acquiescence in passing a legis-
lative response to a budget crisis.
If the legislative process were the only arena in
which interest groups could hope to have their policy
goals enacted, those obstacles to majority decision-
making might force compromise. With no other
option available, the diverse interest groups might
be forced to come together to agree on solutions to
budget shortfalls. But the legislative process is
hardly the only game in town.
California’s initiative process gives interest
groups a ready alternative to the Legislature for
achieving their budgetary policy goals. California’s
voters can constrain and override decisions of the
Legislature through use of ballot initiatives. Propo-
sition 13 is the most notable example of voters using
initiatives to shape California’s fiscal constitution,
but it is not the only example.
Consider this partial list of the initiatives affect-
ing California’s budget that were passed following
the adoption of Proposition 13 in 1978:
• in 1979 Proposition 4 created state spending
limits, such that annual appropriations are
limited based on previous-year appropriations,
and revenues in excess of those limits must be
returned;
• in 1982 propositions 5 and 6 abolished the
state’s inheritance and gift taxes. Also, Propo-
sition 7 required a partial indexing of the
state’s income tax;
• in 1986 Proposition 47 required that revenue
from motor vehicle license fees be allocated to
cities and counties. Also, Proposition 62 re-
quired that new local taxes be approved by a
two-thirds vote of the governing body and a
majority of local voters;
• in 1988 Proposition 98 mandated that 40 per-
cent of the state’s general account budget be
dedicated to K-12 education and to community
college funding. Also, Proposition 99 added a
25-cent-per-pack tax on cigarettes, with the
proceeds dedicated to healthcare, education,
and recreation;
• in 1990 Proposition 111 relaxed some of the
previously adopted appropriation limits;
• in 1993 Proposition 172 raised the state’s gen-
eral sales tax by 0.5 percentage points, with the
revenue dedicated to public safety programs;
that healthcare spending will grow to over 45 percent of GDP
by 2080. That massive growth threatens to overwhelm the
funding power of both the states and the national govern-
ment, causing programs like Medicaid to take over an in-
creasing percentage of state budgets. Congressional Budget
Office, ‘‘The Long-Term Budget Outlook,’’ December 2007, pp.
22-24.
10The two-thirds supermajority requirement for raising
taxes was placed in the state constitution by Proposition 13 in
1978. The two-thirds supermajority requirement for passing
budgets dates back to the Riley-Stewart Amendment enacted
in 1933.
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• in 1996 Proposition 218 strengthened the voter
approval requirements for new local taxes,
mandating that two- thirds of voters approve
new local nongeneral taxes;
• in 1998 Proposition 10 increased the tax on
cigarettes by 25 cents per pack, with the rev-
enue dedicated to childhood development pro-
grams;
• in 2002 Proposition 42 required that motor
vehicle fuel sales and use tax revenue be dedi-
cated to transportation purposes. Also, Propo-
sition 49 mandated an increase in state funding
for after-school programs; and
• in 2004 Proposition 1A established several
measures to protect local funding sources. Also,
Proposition 58 established a budget reserve
fund and placed restrictions on the use of deficit
bonds, and Proposition 63 levied an additional
1 percent income tax on taxpayers with incomes
in excess of $1 million, with the revenue dedi-
cated to mental health services.
As that partial list should make clear, voter
initiatives play an important role in shaping Cali-
fornia’s budget policy. Even the voter recall of Gov.
Gray Davis in 2003 can be viewed as part of Cali-
fornia’s fiscal constitution, because the success of
the recall has been viewed as coming at least par-
tially in response to Davis’s tripling of vehicle li-
cense fees.
Admittedly, the need to gather a large number of
signatures to qualify an initiative for the ballot is a
major hurdle in using the initiative process as an
alternative to the legislative process. But once an
initiative qualifies for the ballot, it requires only a
simple majority of voters to become law, even when
the initiative contains a constitutional amendment.
Whereas legislative budgetary reforms require two-
thirds votes in both chambers, a budgetary initiative
needs the support of only half of the voters plus one.
For an interest group coalition whose will is
thwarted in the Legislature, that dynamic can make
the initiative process an attractive alternative.
Moreover, it is often easier to pass budgetary
initiatives than the 50-percent-plus-one math would
suggest. Recent research in political psychology has
confirmed that voters find it very difficult to under-
stand budgetary tradeoffs. Voters are far more sup-
portive of tax cuts, or of increased spending on
popular programs, when those questions are asked
independently. When voters are asked to evaluate a
budgetary package including both tax cuts and re-
ductions in specific spending programs (or increased
funding for spending programs along with specified
tax hikes), the voters are far less likely to approve of
the measures. Psychologist Jonathan Baron and law
Prof. Edward McCaffery have labeled that voter
tendency the ‘‘isolation effect.’’ Reviewing the experi-
mental evidence, they conclude that political actors
— such as the sponsors of ballot initiatives — can
manipulate voter responses by controlling how bud-
getary decisions are described.
That political psychology research confirms what
many political analysts have been claiming for dec-
ades. As many a liberal politician has been heard to
joke: Voters seem to think there is a budgetary line
item called ‘‘waste and inefficiency’’ that can be
reduced to pay for tax cuts — or to resolve budget
crises.
Because of the isolation effect, any
tax cut or tax restriction measure
that makes it to the ballot is likely
to generate significant voter
support.
Because of the isolation effect, any tax cut or tax
restriction measure that makes it to the ballot is
likely to generate significant voter support. Simi-
larly, any ballot measure that increases spending on
popular programs is also likely to receive significant
voter approval. The opponents of those measures
will undoubtedly try to explain the tradeoffs and
budgetary implications of reducing revenue or tying
up funds, but those opponents will start with a
major disadvantage because the sponsors of the
ballot initiatives will initially control the framing of
the initiatives. Without a large media campaign to
explain the stakes to the voting public, it will be all
too easy for voters to approve both the tax cuts and
the spending increases, regardless of the conse-
quences for the state’s budget.
California’s fiscal constitution is thus character-
ized by a supermajority requirement and other re-
strictions that impede budgetary decision-making at
the legislative level and a relatively accessible alter-
native in the initiative process. That combination
gives interest groups little incentive to compromise
or to work together on solutions to California’s
budgetary problems.
What Can Be Done?
Of course, the best way to resolve a budget crisis
is for legislators to come together to pass some
combination of tax increases and spending cuts. If
exhortations could suffice, this article would end
with a call for legislators to rise above their paro-
chial interests to reach a sustainable compromise.
Yet the U.S. political system was built on a
Madisonian understanding that political actors will
pursue their own narrow interests and must thus be
constrained by institutional structures. This article
has argued that the failure of California’s politicians
to deal responsibly with the state’s budgetary prob-
lems is at least partially the fault of the state’s
flawed fiscal constitution. Therefore, it is worth
considering potential reforms to California’s fiscal
Special Report
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constitution. The remainder of this section will ana-
lyze several possible reforms.
Increase the Use of Rainy Day Funds
Once its economy recovers, California will likely
enjoy a period of budgetary surpluses before the
next downturn and resulting budget crisis. If Cali-
fornia could save in a rainy day fund the surplus
revenue generated during the upturn, that would go
a long way toward minimizing the pain during later
downturns.
Rainy day funds (or budget stabilization funds)
help to ward off budget crises in two ways. First, the
revenue saved can be used to maintain spending
during subsequent downturns without the need to
raise taxes. Second, any revenue placed in a rainy
day fund during an upturn is unavailable for in-
creased spending or for tax cuts during the upturn.
Hence, to the extent revenue is stored in a rainy day
fund, they cannot be used to create unsustainable
policy changes that will haunt the state in the next
budget crisis.
California already has a rainy day fund. Revenue
stored in the fund exceeded 10 percent of general
fund expenditures in fiscal 1999-2000 and 2005-
2006 — the final year of the 1990’s tech boom and of
the mid-decade partial recovery driven by the hous-
ing bubble.11 Recognizing the advantages of rainy
day funds, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) has
called for mandatory caps on future spending in-
creases, with any excess revenue automatically di-
verted to the state’s rainy day fund.
California would undoubtedly benefit from
greater use of rainy day funds. But other states’
experiences with proposals for mandatory contribu-
tions to rainy day funds do not provide much cause
for optimism. Remember that state forecasters —
both government employees and their private-sector
equivalents — tend to be overly optimistic in their
future projections during economic upturns. When
state coffers are overflowing, large surpluses stored
in rainy day funds become a tempting target for any
politician who seeks to implement a new spending
program or to pass a tax cut. Political actors are
generally rewarded for bringing home the bacon —
passing tax cuts or spending increases that their
constituents desire. Fiscal prudence is seldom re-
warded at the ballot box, because the beneficial
consequences of that prudence are not felt until
years later. California’s system of term limits exac-
erbates that problem by causing legislators to focus
even more on the short term.
Nevertheless, it is probably still worth experi-
menting with different methods for increasing the
use of rainy day funds during boom years. Manda-
tory spending caps seem a poor way to achieve that
end, however, because spending caps have generally
proven easy to evade and do not apply to unsustain-
able tax cuts — including spending-like tax expendi-
tures. Ultimately, increased funding for rainy day
funds will occur only to the extent there is political
support for protecting the fund revenue. Any man-
dates or prohibitions passed during bust years will
be all too easy to overturn or circumvent if they are
not backed up by enough political support.
The best mechanism for increasing
the use of rainy day funds might
be to dedicate all revenue from
capital gains taxation to the rainy
day fund.
Consequently, the best mechanism for increasing
the use of rainy day funds might be to dedicate all
revenue from capital gains taxation to the rainy day
fund, making that revenue unavailable for general
account spending. Because capital gains taxes are
by far the most volatile of state funding sources, that
approach has the advantage of reinforcing a norm
that capital gains revenue should not be used to
fund long-term budgetary commitments. To divert
capital gains revenue or other rainy day funds to
support general account spending, the Legislature
could be required to declare the existence of a budget
crisis through a supermajority vote (ideally requir-
ing a larger supermajority than needed to pass a
budget, perhaps a three-fourths supermajority if the
current supermajority requirements for passing a
budget are maintained).
Whether capital gains revenue is dedicated to
rainy day funds, or whether some other approach is
devised to increase the use of rainy day funds, it will
be necessary to create a clear political understand-
ing that rainy day funds are to be used only when
the state is experiencing a significant economic
downturn. Without political support for that norm,
no mandatory rule is likely to be successful.
Amend the Supermajority Requirement for
Passing Budgets
Many reform commissions have recommended
abolishing California’s two-thirds supermajority re-
quirement for passing state budgets. As the discus-
sion here has made clear, this article supports those
recommendations. However, when given the option
of ending that requirement by passing Proposition
56 in 2004, voters defeated the proposition by a
11California Department of Finance, ‘‘Historical Data Bud-
get Expenditures,’’ January 2006, available at http://www.
dof.ca.gov/Budget/BudgetCharts/chart-b.pdf.
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nearly 2-to-1 margin.12 At least for now, it seems
likely that the supermajority requirement is here to
stay.
Perhaps more politically feasible would be to
relax the supermajority requirement so as to allow
the passage of an emergency budget with a simple
majority vote during economic downturns. A consti-
tutional amendment might be passed such that
when the state controller declares a downturn or a
budget crisis, and that declaration is ratified by a
simple majority in both legislative chambers, the
supermajority requirement would be temporarily
waived.
Emergency budgets passed without a supermajor-
ity vote could be limited so that only temporary tax
increases or spending cuts are permitted. At the
beginning of each year, both the controller and the
Legislature might be required to reauthorize the
existence of a downturn or budget crisis, with all of
the provisions in the emergency budget lasting only
as long as that reauthorization continues.
To assuage potential concerns about one party
controlling both the Legislature and the controller’s
office and using that control to reauthorize emer-
gency budgets into perpetuity, the approval of those
budgets could require an escalating supermajority
vote.13 Whereas a simple majority might suffice to
keep the emergency budget in effect for the first
couple years, the vote threshold for reauthorizing
the budget could be gradually increased in sub-
sequent years until it reached the two-thirds super-
majority requirement for authorizing nonemergency
budgets.
Determining the political feasibility of a proposal
to exempt emergency budgets from the two-thirds
supermajority requirement is beyond the scope of
this article. However, the approach has the advan-
tage of giving the Legislature more flexibility in
responding to budget crises while still requiring a
substantial consensus to change the long-term path
of California’s taxes or spending. By exempting
emergency budgets from the supermajority require-
ment, California might avoid some of the dynamics
that have led to long delays in passing budgets and
to the repeated use of gimmicks when budgets are
passed during downturns.
Reform the Initiative Process
California’s ballot initiative process was designed
so that voters would have a check on unresponsive
legislatures. At least to some extent, that process
may be achieving its goals in the fiscal realm. It is
certainly plausible that Proposition 13 was passed
because of legislative unresponsiveness to voter an-
ger about property taxes. Similar stories could be
told about most — if not all — of the other budget-
affecting ballot initiatives adopted over the last 30
years.
However, when combined with the two-thirds
supermajority rule for the Legislature to raise taxes
or to pass a budget, the initiative process has moved
much of the locus of fiscal policymaking away from
the Legislature. The overall structure of California’s
fiscal constitution has thus impeded voter account-
ability.
California’s Legislature is currently dominated by
Democrats who appear to want higher taxes and
spending. If the legislative process were allowed to
proceed unchecked, we might expect that coalition to
increase taxes and spending until voters protested
by electing more fiscal conservatives. But under the
current system, the minority coalition is generally
able to block significant budgetary changes, result-
ing in gridlock and the lack of a clearly accountable
party.
In light of those dynamics, a case might be made
for disallowing all voter initiatives with budgetary
consequences. Considering the conclusions from re-
cent political psychology research that voters find it
particularly difficult to understand budgetary
tradeoffs, fiscal policy is perhaps an area for which
the Legislature is better suited to making policy
than are the voters directly.
Without going to the extreme of prohibiting all
initiatives that affect the budget —which is unlikely
to be politically feasible in any case — a strong
argument can be made for a rule requiring that
future ballot initiatives that affect the budget be
revenue neutral (or ‘‘self-funding’’). In other words,
any initiative that has the effect of lowering taxes
would have to specify in detail which spending
programs would be cut to offset the loss in revenue.
And any ballot initiative that increases spending
would need to specify which taxes would be raised to
pay for that spending.
To make that proposal effective, the controller’s
office (or some other body) would probably have to
fill in some of the details regarding the budgetary
consequences of a ballot initiative after the initiative
received the required number of signatures but
before it appeared on the ballot. The sponsors of an
initiative might thus write that a new spending
program would be funded by an increase in the sales
12Proposition 56, known as the Budget Accountability Act,
would have reduced the supermajority requirement for pass-
ing the budget from requiring a two-thirds majority to requir-
ing a 55 percent majority. The proposition would also have
made the governor and legislators lose salary for every day
the budget was delivered late. The measure failed to pass,
with 2,185,868 (34.3 percent) votes in favor and 4,183,188
(65.7 percent) against.
13The concept of an escalating supermajority vote is drawn
from a proposal by Bruce Ackerman for how Congress should
deal with authorizing emergency powers. Bruce Ackerman,
Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of
Terrorism, 2006.
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tax rate, with the controller’s office responsible for
ruling on how large a sales tax increase would be
required to fund the new program. The initiative
would then go to the voters with the controller’s
numbers on what would be required to make the
initiative revenue neutral.
A requirement for revenue-neutral
ballot initiatives should improve at
least some of the dynamics that
now result in legislative gridlock
and irresponsible management of
California’s budget crises.
Although mandating revenue-neutral ballot ini-
tiatives would not end all of the dynamics wherein
interest groups have incentives to use the initiative
process instead of reaching a compromise at the
legislative level, the proposal would at least counter-
act the consequences wherein voter psychology and
the isolation effect make it too easy to pass budget-
affecting ballot initiatives. A requirement for
revenue-neutral ballot initiatives should thus im-
prove at least some of the dynamics that now result
in legislative gridlock and irresponsible manage-
ment of California’s budget crises.
Adopt Budgetary Autoadjusters
Another approach for reforming California’s fiscal
constitution would institute budgetary auto-
adjusters.14 In essence, these are proposals for
changing the default policy outcomes that occur in
the absence of legislative action. As this article was
being written, California’s Legislature had again
missed its constitutional deadline for passing a
budget. While Democrats and Republicans bicker
about how to resolve the state’s massive budget
shortfall, the state’s financial picture continues to
deteriorate, generating uncertainty about the future
of both tax and spending policies.
Imagine an alternative scenario wherein ap-
pointed budgetary officials adjusted tax rates or
spending authorizations based on formulas previ-
ously adopted by the Legislature. In the absence of
affirmative legislative action, that default budget
would be adopted and would remain in effect until
amended by the Legislature.
To be effective, the baseline (or default) budget
would be set based on prespecified formulas for how
tax and spending policies should be adjusted to
reflect changing economic conditions. When the
state economy enters a downturn, the appointed
budgetary officials would be charged with raising
the tax rates or reducing spending authorizations in
the manner specified by prior legislation so that the
baseline budget would remain balanced. Hence, the
authorization formulas would have to be set so as to
authorize some combination of tax rates being
raised during downturns and lowered during up-
turns, and spending levels being reduced during
downturns and increased during upturns.
Besides its effects on the formal budget process,
creating an official baseline budget would have
further consequences, because what constitutes a
tax cut, tax increase, cut in spending, or spending
increase depends entirely on what figures are used
for the default levels of taxes and spending. Those
terms are crucial for the way the budget process is
perceived. For instance, a majority of Republicans in
the Legislature have pledged not to support any ‘‘tax
increases.’’ But what do we mean by the term ‘‘tax
increase’’ in an environment in which the ordinary
workings of the business cycle are constantly chang-
ing the relationship between tax rates and revenue
raised?
What do we mean by the term ‘tax
increase’ in an environment in
which the ordinary workings of the
business cycle are constantly
changing the relationship between
tax rates and revenue raised?
The current political understanding of the bud-
getary baseline in California appears to be based on
a notion that tax rates are to be held constant (while
revenue fluctuates with the business cycle) and that
spending levels are to be gradually increased based
on prior authorizations. Yet that notion of Califor-
nia’s budget baseline is essentially arbitrary. An
equally plausible budgetary baseline might have tax
revenue remaining constant in the absence of legis-
lative action, with the tax rates adjusted annually to
maintain consistency in the revenue as the economy
cycles between busts and booms.
Presumably, the justification for both the two-
thirds supermajority requirement for increasing
taxes and the Republicans’ anti-tax-increase pledge
is to help restrict the size of government. Yet cycli-
cally adjusted tax and spending levels are a much
better measure for the size of government than are
current-year tax and spending levels. Under the
current system, fiscal conservatives have little
power to prevent spending increases during eco-
nomic boom years when the Legislature enjoys extra
revenue as long as tax rates are kept constant.
Instead, fiscal conservatives primarily fight tax rate
14The term ‘‘budgetary autoadjusters’’ refers to a set of
proposals for coping with state budget crises that the author
of this article is developing. Readers interested in learning
about budgetary autoadjusters in more detail should contact
the author to receive copies of his draft manuscript.
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increases during economic downturns, because that
is the only time in which the conservative minority
coalition has the power to restrict the size of govern-
ment.
California’s existing understanding of its budget-
ary baseline thus effectively means debates about
the size of government occur primarily during bust
years. Unsurprisingly, the Legislature finds it diffi-
cult to resolve those deep ideological debates during
the short time periods required for passing a budget
following a downturn in revenue. Long periods of
impasse followed by irresponsible budgets that rely
on borrowing and gimmicks are the almost inevi-
table result.
Moving toward a system of budgetary auto-
adjusters would have at least three advantages over
California’s existing process. First, the Legislature
would find it easier to pass budgets during bust
years (or to allow the default budget to go into
effect), thus reducing the use of borrowing and
gimmicks. By ending the dynamics that have led the
Legislature to repeatedly miss its constitutional
deadline for passing budgets, a system of budgetary
autoadjusters might help restore California’s credit-
worthiness and the voters’ trust in state govern-
ment.
Second, debates about the proper size of state
government would no longer be forced into a com-
pressed process with looming deadlines. Under a
system of budgetary autoadjusters, those debates
could occur anytime during the business cycle and
would be determined more by changing voter pref-
erences than by changing economic conditions. In
place of the current system in which governors and
legislators who happen to take office during boom
years are able to enact their preferences for new
spending programs and for tax cuts, while governors
and legislators in office during bust years must take
the blame for enacting painful coping measures, a
system of budgetary autoadjusters would help to
equalize both opportunity and blame across the
business cycle. In that manner, budgetary autoad-
justers would enhance the accountability of elected
officials to voters.
Third, adopting a system of budgetary autoad-
justers should make it easier to predict both tax and
spending policy. The current budget process creates
uncertainty because the Legislature regularly in-
creases spending while lowering taxes during boom
years, only to reverse course to enact a combination
of tax increases and spending cuts during economic
downturns. Increasing the predictability of tax law
changes would improve the economy, as businesses
and investors would find it easier to plan. Similarly,
increasing the predictability of spending authoriza-
tions would help program managers better use their
funds. Under the current system, there are far too
many problems like buildings being constructed
during upturns only to be left vacant during down-
turns as budgets are cut.
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